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【MPAcc中國網(wǎng)訊】中山大學(xué)管理學(xué)院講座題目

Menu mechanisms

主講嘉賓

周愚 早稻田大學(xué)高等研究所講師

講座時(shí)間

2019年9月27日（周五）15：00-17：30

主持人

陳斌副教授中山大學(xué)管理學(xué)院

講座地點(diǎn)

管理學(xué)院善思堂M201

主辦單位

“戰(zhàn)略與創(chuàng)業(yè)創(chuàng)新”科研團(tuán)隊(duì)

嘉賓簡(jiǎn)介

周愚，現(xiàn)任早稻田大學(xué)高等研究所講師，美國《數(shù)學(xué)評(píng)論》評(píng)論員。本科碩士畢業(yè)于南京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系，博士畢業(yè)于日本大阪大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究科，獲理論經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。目前研究方向?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)設(shè)計(jì)，拍賣理論，博弈論以及公共經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。

講座摘要

Many important dynamic mechanisms are menu mechanisms, where at each history an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We investigate when a menu mechanism and a convention| which species a strategy for each agent given his type | together form an ex-post perfect implementation of a rule. We find that if (i) each agent's possible preferences over his assignments include all strict rankings; (ii) the rule is strategy-proof, (iii) an agent can never select an assignment twice along any play; (iv) the convention species that each agent always selects a most-preferred assignment, and that subject to this he breaks ties consistently; and (v) the rule's outcome is always reached when agents follow the convention; then we have an ex-post perfect implementation of the rule (Theorem 1). If, moreover, preferences are always strict and the rule is group strategy-proof, then we have a full subgame perfect implementation of the rule (Theorem 2). In the event of such double implementation, each ex-post perfect convention is compatible with the rule.