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【MBAChina網(wǎng)訊】華人學(xué)者營銷協(xié)會(huì)第六屆中國市場(chǎng)營銷國際學(xué)術(shù)年會(huì)（China Marketing International Conference 2018）將于2018年7月20-22日在上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)舉行。

會(huì)議以“智慧營銷：人、技術(shù)與創(chuàng)新”為主題，由華人學(xué)者營銷協(xié)會(huì)、上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)商學(xué)院、上海市市場(chǎng)學(xué)會(huì)共同主辦。

CMIC設(shè)有9個(gè)特邀分論壇，分別代表營銷研究和實(shí)踐領(lǐng)域的9個(gè)專題。大會(huì)邀請(qǐng)與主題相關(guān)的優(yōu)秀青年學(xué)者和業(yè)界人士進(jìn)行專題分享和交流。這些分會(huì)場(chǎng)時(shí)間安排在7月21日和7月22日下午，歡迎您選擇自己感興趣的專題前往。

今天，為大家介紹第八輯內(nèi)容。

第八輯零售和渠道管理分會(huì)

7月22日 下午15:30-19:00

大會(huì)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)通知

分會(huì)主席

周晨希(廈門大學(xué))、孫炯(普渡大學(xué))

演講人介紹

周晨希

周晨?，F(xiàn)任廈門大學(xué)管理學(xué)院助理教授。他于美國佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)商學(xué)院獲得市場(chǎng)營銷學(xué)博士。

他的研究興趣包括國際營銷、營銷戰(zhàn)略和行為經(jīng)濟(jì)建模。他的博士論文已發(fā)表在Journal of International Business Studies 雜志。周博士目前最新研究問題包括：零售行業(yè)銷售信息披露，中美跨國并購的比較研究，預(yù)售模型與供應(yīng)鏈管理。周博士教授營銷學(xué)原理和客戶關(guān)系管理等課程。

徐子彬

徐子彬現(xiàn)任上海交通大學(xué)安泰管理學(xué)院市場(chǎng)學(xué)助理教授，2017年畢業(yè)于南加州大學(xué)馬歇爾商學(xué)院，獲得管理學(xué)博士學(xué)位。他還獲得過統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)碩士學(xué)位和計(jì)算科學(xué)學(xué)士學(xué)位，并曾在堪城密蘇里大學(xué)進(jìn)行過戰(zhàn)略創(chuàng)新與創(chuàng)業(yè)管理方向的博士學(xué)習(xí)。他曾獲得南加州大學(xué)年度最佳博士授課獎(jiǎng)。

他的研究興趣是使用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)模型分析企業(yè)定價(jià)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略，消費(fèi)者信息傳播，產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新與設(shè)計(jì)，以及互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺(tái)的治理。他的研究成果曾發(fā)表在IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management。

高月濤

高月濤現(xiàn)任廈門大學(xué)管理學(xué)院助理教授。他是新加坡國立大學(xué)管理學(xué)博士。他曾在長(zhǎng)江商學(xué)院擔(dān)任過案例研究員。

他的研究興趣是打假和行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)在市場(chǎng)營銷的應(yīng)用。他的博士論文已被Marketing Science接受，即將發(fā)表。

劉國偉

劉國偉現(xiàn)任河北工業(yè)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院工業(yè)工程系講師。他畢業(yè)于天津大學(xué)，獲得管理學(xué)博士學(xué)位，并曾在美國伊利諾伊大學(xué)香檳分校Gies商學(xué)院做聯(lián)合培養(yǎng)博士。

劉博士的研究興趣在于供應(yīng)鏈管理以及市場(chǎng)營銷與運(yùn)營管理的交叉研究。他的研究成果發(fā)表在Omega, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research等期刊上。 劉博士的最新研究方向包括: 消費(fèi)者公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)定價(jià)的影響，以及基于社會(huì)責(zé)任的企業(yè)產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新與定價(jià)策略研究。

分享內(nèi)容摘要

周晨希教授的分享主題

The Curious Case of Withdrawn Comparable Store Sales Disclosures: An Empirical Investigation of the Retailing Industry

Juncai Jiang

Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech

Chenxi Zhou*

School of Management, Xiamen University

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

Since the late 1990s, many retailers have ceased disclosing their monthly comparable store sales (CSS) metrics, which is notable considering modern demands for information transparency. Drawing on economics, finance, and marketing literatures, we propose four potential reasons for the withdrawal of CSS disclosure: (1) avoidance of competitive information leakage, (2) concealment of poor performance, (3) decreased relevance of the metrics, and (4) prevention of management myopia. Testable hypotheses reflecting each plausible reason are tested using a unique dataset of publicly-traded retailers, spanning two decades between 1995 and 2015. The results indicate that retailers halt CSS disclosure in order to avoid information leakage towards competitors while other potential reasons lack empirical support. Specifically, retailers facing fierce competition, with undiversified customer assets, and that sell products with long life cycles are likely to limit their CSS disclosure. An event study analysis reveals that investors generally reward this withdrawal decision, and retailers in more competitive markets and with less diversified customer assets receive higher abnormal returns.

徐子彬教授的分享主題

Product Line Design with Superior Information on Consumers’ Preferences: Implications of Data Aggregation

Zibin Xu*

Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Anthony Dukes

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

With the explosion of data collection technologies, a firm may learn superior information on consumers’ preferences, especially when consumers have imperfect prior knowledge of their marginal utility for product quality. This research examines the welfare implications of product line design with superior information: Do consumers receive better fitting products or simply have more surplus extracted? Is learning superior information ever unprofitable? We examine a scenario in which data aggregation creates superior information on consumers’ preferences beyond consumers’ prior knowledge. Consumers’ rational suspicion, however, may confound the firm’s ability to price discriminate using the superior information. We find that product line design with superior information may lead to a strict Pareto optimal outcome for both the firm and every consumer. In addition, the firm may lower the price of the high-quality product and raise the quality of the low-quality product. This tends to reverse the classic quality distortion and thus restore the efficiency in product line design.

高月濤教授的分享主題

Service-Switching Infomediaries

Yuetao Gao*

School of Management, Xiamen University

Wei Shi Lim

National University of Singapore

Xiaoyan Xu

National University of Singapore

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

In some service industries (e.g., credit cards, mobile phone plans, insurance), many consumers do not carry the service plan that best fits their needs. Recently, service-switching infomediaries have entered the market and consumers can locate better service plans by using websites' free service if the infomediaries can reach them. An infomediary is an Internet-based information provider that gathers information about consumers' preferences based on their existing consumption behaviors and recommends service providers to them; however, the choices are restricted to only the service providers enrolled with the infomediary. We examine how provision of information by an infomediary affects service providers' profits and consumer surplus. We find that when a large proportion of uninformed consumers are not matched with their ideal service, the infomediary profits by adopting a non-exclusive contract to enroll all service providers. In addition, enrolling with the infomediary is a dominant strategy for service providers. However, they may consequently realize less profit. Furthermore, we show that although the infomediary intends to provide information such that consumers can make a better service choice, consumers are worse off if the reach of the infomediary to uninformed consumers is high. Consumers are better off if the reach is low.

劉國偉講師的分享主題

Do Consumer Fairness Concerns Soften Price Competition? The Role of Declining Costs

Guowei Liu*

School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology

Yunchuan Liu

Gies College of Business, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign

Jiong Sun

Department of Consumer Science, Purdue University

Jianxiong Zhang

College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

Firms enjoy declining cost per unit of output with increasing cumulative output in a variety of industries, which gives rise to consumer concerns about transaction fairness. Consumers are less likely to purchase from a firm if it continues to reap an unfairly high profit margin. Intuitively, such consumer fairness concerns will induce firms to lower their prices. We develop an analytical framework to show, however, that firms may set higher prices with increasing consumer fairness concerns in the presence of competition. The indirect effect that consumer fairness concerns soften price competition caused by cost reductions dominates the direct effect that they intensify price competition caused by product substitution, when the cost-declining impact is sufficiently strong. Moreover, whether consumer fairness concerns increase or decrease social welfare also depends on the strength of the cost-declining effect. We also show the robustness of our main results by extending our model to a channel setting with quantity-discount con- tracts.